This paper reports on our experience with providing Information Flow Control (IFC) as a library. Our aim was to support the use of an unmodified Platform as a Service (PaaS) cloud infrastructure by IFC-aware web applications. We discuss how Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP) overcomes the limitations of RubyTrack, our first approach. Although use of AOP has been mentioned as a possibility in past IFC literature we believe this paper to be the first illustration of how such an implementation can be attempted.
Introduction
In 2012 we developed a web portal, in collaboration with Public Health England, to grant access by brain cancer patients to their records [35] . As well as standard authentication and access control we used Information Flow Control (IFC) to track the flow of data end-to-end through the system. For this purpose, we used RubyPermission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). Track, a taint-tracking system for Ruby, developed by the SafeWeb project [17] .
However, we came to realise certain limitations of the mechanisms we had deployed. For example, to enforce the required IFC policy, we manually inserted IFC checks at selected application component boundaries. In practice, objects and classes are the natural representation of application components within an object oriented language and it seems natural to relate security concerns with those objects. We should therefore associate the primitives and mechanisms to enforce IFC with selected objects. Furthermore, we wish to be able to assign boundary checks on any class or object without further development overhead. We also wish to be able to exploit the inheritance property to define rules that apply to categories of objects (for example defining a boundary check for all possible children of I/O). We therefore decided to investigate the use of Aspect Oriented Programming (AOP), and selected the Aquarium library [54] , instead of RubyTrack, to use with our Ruby implementation to provide IFC-aware web applications.
We believe the techniques we have used to provide IFC mechanisms for Ruby can be extended to any Object Oriented Language (OO Language) with an AOP library, such as Java [23] , C++ [44] or JavaScript [55] . AOP has advantages over our earlier approach: IFC label tracking and enforcement can be applied to any object and/or method invocation; programmers need have minimal concern about the underlying implementation; maintenance overheads are low, for example, when there are changes in the library code. These factors contribute to the overall reliability of software developed using AOP [50] .
It has already been pointed out [11] that AOP can be used to implement security functions such as authentication and access control. Our main objective is to separate IFC concerns from the development of the application; we believe that functional issues and security issues should be kept well separated whenever possible. The AOP paradigm allows us to separate the core functionality developed by a programmer from the policy specified by a security expert [50] . Furthermore, the literature on providing IFC through a library [29, 31, 34, 56] has already hinted that AOP techniques could be used to implement IFC.
However, we make some assumptions on the environment and the problems we are addressing. First, we assume that the developer is not adversarial; the aim is to protect against inadvertent disclosure of information through bugs within the application. Second, we focus on the design of web applications using a framework such as Sinatra or Rails to be, for example, deployed on a PaaS (Platform as a Service) cloud, using readily available languages/interpreters. Third, in this context, we assume the application's host ensures that no data can be disclosed outside of the application. Finally, we assume that the organisation running the application is willing to accept a performance overhead in exchange for increased security assurance. Other solutions can be envisioned for other circumstances, y : = x mod 2 Figure 3 . Explicit information flow x : = x mod 2 y : = 0 i f x = 1 t h e n y : = 1 Figure 4 . Implicit information flow [40] than centrally mandated. However, system support is needed at runtime for the continuous monitoring of data flows.
IFC implementations must ensure that labels can be allocated to principals but not be forged by them; can be allocated to data and "stick" to them; and that label checking enforces security policy regarding all aspects of information flow.
Practical IFC systems cannot work with policies that only allow data to become more restrictively labelled, for example secret data passed to a principal with top secret clearance becomes top secret when incorporated at that level. There are situations where constraints should be relaxed, for example, to enable the public release of previously classified data. The privilege to override secrecy IFC restrictions is known as the declassification privilege. In order to declassify an information item, the owner or owners must agree to remove their policy restrictions. This method of declassification again appears to remove the need for a central authority, as every owner is responsible for its own policy. But since the processes running on behalf of a principal oi, or the precise hierarchy of principals, is only known at runtime, declassification also requires runtime support.
In this style of language a variable declaration can be augmented with an annotation to describe the policy associated with the data item. Examples can be seen in the solutions proposed by Denning [9] or Myers [33] . It is in these cases the programmers' responsibility to not only understand the algorithm being implemented but also the desired security policy [58] . But the security constraints may not all be clear during the functional design phase and inconsistencies can arise at runtime. It is generally better to separate security concerns from functional ones, limiting the impact they have on each other in the engineered system. We decided in this work to explore the use of AOP to enforce IFC constraints specifically in order to provide this separation.
Implicit Flow and Covert Channels
In this paper, as in most similar projects on IFC enforced at the library level, we do not address the problem of covert channels and implicit flow [2, 10, 15] . Explicit flows from x to y, noted x ⇒ y are caused by passing data between variables, as illustrated in Fig. 3 , or performing operations or method calls on such variables.
An implicit flow of information arises from the control structure of the program. Fig, 4 illustrates an implicit flow x ⇒ y equivalent to the explicit flow illustrated in Fig. 3 . It is possible to track such an assignment by introducing a process sensitivity level, as defined in the US DoD "orange book"
1 , in which case the assignment of y can be detected at runtime. We could consider that any variable modified within the if statement (or any function called from it) must be assumed to create an information flow. However, in the case x = 0, no value is assigned to y and therefore no flow is detected even if it exists.
It is possible to prevent such flows remaining unnoticed by applying the label from the if to any assignment happening after 1 http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/850001p.pdf x : = x mod 2 z : = z mod 2 y : = 0 w : = 0 i f x = 1 t h e n y : = 1 i f z = 1 t h e n y : = 1 w: = x mod 2 Figure 5 . Example of label creep the if statement. However, this means that the number of labels assigned to variables will increase [15] , often unnecessarily. This leads to data with higher sensitivity than intended, known as label creep [38] . This phenomenon is illustrated in Fig. 5 . From the Denning model, briefly described in section 2.2, we expect that w = x; that is, x and w are of the same security level. However, if we enforce process sensitivity levels, we have w = x ⊕ z even if we know there is no z ⇒ w.
To address the concerns brought by the benevolent developer assumption, it has been suggested that an implicit flow can be prevented by the preemptive halting of program execution [2, 41] . However, this could prevent legitimate applications from terminating [2] . Therefore, to deal with potentially malicious code, variablelevel runtime taint tracking can be combined with static analysis techniques [52] .
At present in our project we do not consider implicit flow nor other covert channels [20] such as timing channels, storage channels [26, 27] or termination channels [53] . We briefly discuss in section 7 how some of these problems could be solved in an AOP context.
The FlowR IFC Model
IFC models are used to represent and constrain the flow of information within an application. In this paper, we focus on the aspects of the model relating to a single application rather than a distributed, multi-application environment.
In the DEFCon project [31] , AOP was used with Java to enforce IFC by inserting IFC policy around selected methods. In FlowR, we extend those ideas by providing IFC at the level of objects, classes and methods, and provide basic primitives to enforce IFC. Our approach is not specific to Ruby but can be used with any OO Language that supports AOP. Furthermore, our techniques can work with an arbitrary library, without programmers having to know about its inner workings, so requiring little effort from them.
We provide tracking and flow control on what we define as basic variables (strings, integers, floats, etc.) and on arbitrary objects, classes or methods (as required).
In this section we first define the labels associated with objects. We then explain how the labels indicate flows that are and are not allowed and how labels are propagated for allowed flows. Finally, we outline how declassification is achieved.
Security labels
In order to monitor Information Flow we use labels. Our label model is inspired by that proposed by Efstathopoulos et al. [13] .
Every tracked object is associated with two labels: a Receive label and a Send label. The Receive label is used to represent the type of information that is allowed to flow into an object, while Send labels are used to represent the nature of the information and its sensitivity. Send (S) labels are sticky, that is, they will propagate and taint any object they interact with, which ensures that no information can flow untracked. Receive (R) labels however do not propagate and concern only a single object or class.
A label is composed of a set of tags, each representing an individual concern about the information, for example, the origin of the information, its privacy level or its owner. Tags are composed of two elements: a unique identifier t and a marker + or − representing the privileges an object has over the information labelled with this tag. To guarantee that each tag identifier is unique we represent tags using the Ruby concept of symbol which associates with a string an integer guaranteed to be unique in the current execution context. t + and t − indicate the tag with identifier t and privileges + or − respectively.
In a Receive label. An object with a tag t − in its Receive label is not allowed to receive information labelled with the tag t. An object with a tag t + in its Receive label is allowed to receive such information. Receive labels are not changed by the flow of information.
In a Send label. An object with a tag t + in its Send label is allowed to flow to an appropriately labelled destination object and the tag will propagate. An object with a tag t − in its Send label is allowed to flow to an appropriately labelled destination object, but the tag does not propagate. For details on tag propagation see sections 3.2 and 3.4.
We need to add an additional constraint, that only one tag can be associated with some identifier t. This means that in any label L, either t − or t + can exist, but not both. In order to simplify the notation for the rest of the paper, when we write t ∈ L, we mean (t
We also have a special tag, named def ault. Strictly speaking, when unlabeled data are manipulated the empty labels are interpreted as Send label S = {def ault + } and a Receive label R = {def ault + }, that is, such data can be freely transmitted. A label therefore implicitly has def ault + added to its tags, i.e. it is assumed to contain the default privilege def ault + . In order to simplify the notation we can omit the default tag in a label. However, it is also possible to explicitly specify the default label. It is forbidden to set the tag def ault − in the Send label but it may be appropriate to set the tag def ault − in the Receive label, as we see in an example below.
Allowed flows and label propagation
We denote the flow of information between two entities A and B as A → B. We need to define two rules, the first to describe an allowed flow and the second how tags in labels propagate between entities. We define h(t, L) as the function returning the privilege associated with the identifier t in the label L (either R or S). The flow A → B is allowed to occur if ∀t ∈ SA, h(t, RB) = + holds true. We define S ′ A = {t|t ∈ SA ∧ h(t, SA) = +}, as the set of tags that should propagate. After the flow, SB is modified to become
We define the function ALLOW (A, B) which, given two entities A and B returns true if the flow is allowed and false otherwise. We also define the function P ROP AGAT E(A, B) which propagates the send label from A to B according to the definition we have just given. Jajodia et al. [19] specify that information flow occurs only if an object changes its state, i.e. changes the value of one or more of its attributes. However, this assumes that methods cannot be altered at run time [18] , which is not the case in Ruby. Therefore we need to consider more possible flows.
Flow of information occurs on method call. A method call is the interaction of several entities: the caller C, the callee O, the method parameters p1, ..., pn and the returned value r. We distinguish two phases: the calling of the method and the returning phase. Figure 6 . Illustration of label inheritance
During the first phase the flow of information is as follows:
In the second phase the flows first O → r and then r → C. It is important to note that at the end of the second phase we may have Sr = SO. This is due to the fact that class/object attributes may have different labels than the class/object they belong to and that there may be label operations within the execution of the method (a method performing an operation on the returned value of another method call, for example). Having different attribute labels may be useful when doing event processing such as in DEFCon [31] .
Methods, instances, class labels
As mentioned earlier, our model has the notion of method label, object label and class label. Object labels are associated with a particular instance of a class, while class labels are associated with all instances of the class or inherited class. Finally, method labels are associated with a particular method of an object or class.
In OO languages classes inherit from their parents. To maintain this logic, the labels defined in a parent class are inherited by its children. Similarly, an object inherits the label of its class and a method inherits the label of its object or class (in the case that this is a static method). It is important to note here that we only support multilevel hierarchical inheritance, but the model could quite easily be extended to support multiple inheritance if implemented in a language supporting this feature.
We now define how labels are inherited. We consider the inheritance from class A to class B. Note that the process would have to be repeated as often as necessary and also that the process is similar when inheriting from class to object or from class or object to method. The inheritance process is identical for Send and Receive labels.
We note LA the apparent label for class A (taking into account inheritance) and MA the label defined at the level of class A. For a class B inheriting from A, LB = {t|t ∈ LA ∧ t / ∈ MB} ∪ MB. Fig. 6 illustrates this principle. For simplicity in the rest of this paper, label will always refer to the apparent label of an object, class or method. Table 1 illustrates how such a feature can be used to express security concerns throughout an application (we take well known Ruby classes as an example). We first declare that we do not want sensitive information to be written to a file. We also define a tag named internal to protect data that we do not want to leave our Table 1 . Expressing application level security concerns application (for example a private key used for encryption). We therefore forbid such information to go through any I/O. We define a class NurseReport which inherits from File to allow the nurse to perform some operation on the report she writes about a patient. We want all data associated with NurseReports to be considered medical. We therefore associate the {medical} tag with the Send label of NurseReports. An instance of a NurseReport would have the following labels R : {sensitive − , internal − }, S : {medical + }; that is, it does not accept sensitive or internal information and contains medical information which it can send to allowed recipients.
We define two other classes inheriting from File that we call Patient and PublicData. Patient labels are as follows:
As we want our patient well informed, he is only able to read information issued by medical sources (in our case coming from a nurse). He cannot read unlabelled data. PublicData labels are as follows:
{}. This class includes data made public for research. Obviously we do not want confidential medical data to be available to the general public so it is not allowed to flow into PublicData.
However, we want to provide the option for patients to release anonymised data for research purposes. Therefore, we define in the class Patient a method generate_anonymised_record and associate with this method the label R : {}, S : {medical − }. The medical tag of the data input to the method does not propagate so the data returned by this method would not include the medical tag in its label. It could therefore be used with the PublicData class. Algorithm 1 illustrates how such a method would be used. Section 3.4 contains a general discussion of declassification of data. In order to express real security concerns, we should define a label per patient in order to isolate their respective data. We give an example of this, for records of customers' orders, in section 4.
Ensuring secrecy and integrity
Information flow control generally enforces two properties throughout the execution of a program. In this section we first describe how we can guarantee the integrity of an entity, then how we can guarantee secrecy of information.
Integrity
Guaranteeing integrity of an entity means accepting data only from trusted sources. The first step to achieve integrity is to set the Receive label to R = {def ault − }, that is, no unlabelled data can be read. So far, with this Receive label, our entity is unable to receive any information. Now, we need to set a list of trusted sources. This is done by associating a tag with identifier source with the trusted information and setting the Receive label as follows R = {source + , def ault − }. Here we state that this entity will only accept information associated with the tag with identifier source.
Setting R = {source_1 + , source_2 + , def ault − } means that we accept information labelled with one of source_1 + or source_2 + or both. Here we are effectively building a white list. We may also want to prevent onward, indirect propagation of information from a trusted source, i.e. trustworthiness need not be transitive. To achieve this we set the Send label of the source to S = {source − }. As defined in section 3.2, the tag source − does not propagate to the Send label of the receiver of the information. So an entity that built a white list including the tag source + would be able to read information directly from the source entity, but would not be able to read it through an intermediate entity. This is important in order to avoid privilege creep.
Secrecy
Secrecy means preventing secret data from being transmitted to an untrustworthy entity. In our context this would generally mean leaving an application or well-known channel. For example, medical data should only be stored in an appropriate database and never be logged or transmitted to a third party server through the network.
In this context the first thing to do is to associate the secret data or the source of the secret data (such as a database) with a tag that will propagate through all the application. That is, we set its Send label to S = {secret + }. At this point our IFC library will track the data through our application.
The final step to ensure secrecy is to set the receive label of any entity representing a connection outside our application to refuse information with a tag containing this label. This is done simply by setting the entity's Receive label to R = {secret − }. Here we are effectively building a black list of information which cannot be transmitted to this entity.
Declassification
We have defined how to ensure the secrecy and integrity of information through the manipulation of its associated labels and tags. As mentioned in section 2.2 it is also necessary to be able to declassify information. Declassifying is equivalent to removing a tag from the information in order to allow it to flow to an entity where this would otherwise not be allowed.
Suppose the classified information is stored in data with associated label S : {secret + }, R : {}. To declassify the information we pass the data through a method with the following label S : {secret − }, R : {}. This would mean that the returned value would not carry the secret + tag and could be used freely. An example of declassification was given above in section 3.3, where a method was defined to input a medical record and output a corresponding declassified, anonymised medical record. Another example is given in section 4.
FlowR implementation
We saw in section 3.2, that flows are enforced in two phases: on method call and on method return. This corresponds exactly to the AOP standard around advice [23] (discussed in section 2.1). We describe the process in algorithm 2. O is the callee, C is the caller, M the method called, As is the set of attributes and join_point is the join point to be executed. We now describe the step described in algorithm 2; 1) we verify that information is allowed to flow from the caller to the method and we also verify that the information contained in the parameters is allowed to flow in the method; 2) we propagate the labels from the caller and the parameters to the FlowR API call Description start_variable_tracking start basic variable tracking. stop_variable_tracking stop basic variable tracking. protect_class / protect_classes protect all public method of a class(es). protect_object / protect_objects protect all public method of an instanc(es). protect_methods_in_class protect a defined set of methods in a class. protect_methods_in_object protect a defined set of methods in a single instance. execute_procedure_untracked allow a procedure to execute without variable tracking for performance reasons detailed in section 6.
Object methods Description add_receive_tag / add_receive_tags add a single or a set of tags to the receive label associated with an object instance or class depending on the context of the call. add_send_tag / add_send_tags add a single or a set of tags to the send label associated with an object instance or class depending on the context of the call. declassify remove specified tag from the send label. get_send_label / get_receive_label get the receive or send label associated with the object/class Table 2 . FlowR API be able to save the password into the database during the registration and verify the password is correct during authentication.
The proper thing to do to store a password is to hash it with the salt. Therefore, we determine that once hashed, the data associated with the send tag credential loses its secrecy and becomes safe. We can express this with the following method invocation FlowR.protect_methods_in_class ([:digest], Digest::Class, credential: false, nil). This states that the invocation of the method Digest::Class.digest declassifies with respect to the credential tag. We illustrate these points in Fig. 8 .
We now look at another example. In this case a user class is trying to access an order made on a website and stored in the database. In addition to the usual information associated with the order, we maintain in our database the label associated with each entry. When writing to or reading from the database, we ensure that the label associated with instances of orders are propagated to the database by modifying the ActiveRecord::Base implementation. An idea of how this is implemented is illustrated in Fig. 11 . Again, here we do not need to modify any implementation code, it would work for any children of ActiveRecord::Base and this can easily be added after application development.
In the simple example illustrated in Fig. 10 , the instances of the order are associated with a Receive label containing the tag representing the user to whom the order belongs. Furthermore, the user1 instance of the user class can only read information associated with its own tag user1. Therefore, if the user tries to read information belonging to another user the program will simply fail. During the development and testing phases this allows the programmer to detect bugs in the application, and during the release phase to prevent the user accessing data they do not own.
As attributes are also objects it is also possible to assign labels to each attribute. This would represent the different security and confidentiality requirements of the different fields of this structured document. For example, medical records might be shared between medical professionals and social services. Some sensitive information such as HIV status may be restricted to medical professionals FlowR . s t a r t _ v a r i a b l e _ t r a c k i n g FlowR . p r o t e c t _ o b j e c t $ s t d o u t , n i l , { c r e d e n t i a l : f a l s e } p u t s ' n o t h i n g h a p p e n s h e r e ' # no p r o b l e m h e r e s = ' I c a n s a y t h a t ! ' a single label  integrity and secrecy  Tag  simple string  symbol + capability  Enforcement manual by developer at strategic points at public method call on tracked objects Engineering requires overwriting of classes that need to be tracked minimum Table 3 . Feature comparison of FlowR and RubyTrack
We create an isolation bubble by limiting application access to IO classes according to the user context labels and controller labels (in a similar fashion as shown in section 4). In order to propagate labels into and out of the database we store the labels along with the record, i.e. in a row in the database. (We do not support an individual label per column (record field), only per database entry.) We intercept database read and write method calls using the ActiveRecord library feature and add the necessary IFC labelling.
Supporting IFC was again done separately from building the actual application, allowing a clear distinction and separation between functional and security concerns.
Evaluation
Our tests measure the performance of our solution, FlowR, compared with an equivalent solution, that extends native Ruby with RubyTrack, developed for the SafeWeb project [17] . It is important to note the feature differences that explain the performance difference of FlowR when compared with RubyTrack, as illustrated in table 3.
Our first series of tests concern computing intensive tasks. We demonstrate that FlowR does not perform significantly worse than its equivalent using RubyTrack. In addition, no performance optimisation has been attempted for FlowR, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
Our second series of tests is made on a web application, built to provide patient medical records and similar to the one we built in a previous project [35] . We demonstrate that the performance loss compared with native Ruby is of the same order as the earlier implementation, and acceptable from an end user point of view.
All tests have been performed on an i7 2.2GHz 6GB RAM Fedora 17 GNU/Linux Machine.
Compute-intensive tasks
We designed two simple tests. The first consists of counting the number of words in text stored in a file on disk ("Les Contemplations" by Victor Hugo). The second test consists of calculating the first n prime numbers. The execution time of the native Ruby code is our time unit. We compare RubyTrack, FlowR and FlowR using untracked procedure calls (section 4).
The results, shown in table 4, show the same order of magnitude for RubyTrack and FlowR. We did not attempt to optimise performance, and the Aquarium library is known to suffer from performance issues [57] . This is because, at present, Aquarium applies advices at runtime whereas AspectJ and AspectC++ apply them at compile time. Furthermore, it is commonly accepted that performing IFC is generally not a good idea while performing test native RubyTrack FlowR untracked word count 1 6.3 9.8 7.7 prime 1 27 70 1.8 Table 4 . Performance comparison of compute-intensive tasks computing intensive tasks. Using untracked procedure calls provides much better performance. This figure includes the switching of tracking on, off and on again which induces some overhead. However, this overhead becomes negligible as the execution time becomes large. Therefore, untracked procedure calls can provide performance identical to native Ruby in the case of long computing intensive tasks. We also measured the execution time for some key primitives which were: starting tracking 325 ms; stopping tracking 108 ms; protecting an additional class 180 ms; adding protection to a single method 5 ms. As mentioned above, adding AOP advices at runtime, as in Ruby/Aquarium, incurs performance overhead, and care should be taken in deciding when this is necessary. IFC advices should be added during initialization as much as possible.
On the other hand, the cost of adding a label to an existing object is insignificant (it is simply adding an entry to a hash table). Therefore, adding or removing labels during the lifetime of an application does not amount to a significant performance loss.
Brain portal: a web portal application
In order to evaluate our library under realistic conditions we used the data store described in section 5. In order to evaluate the performance of our implementation we queried our data store 1000 times, asking for 50 different, randomly chosen data items. We compare the averaged values obtained with native Ruby, RubyTrack and FlowR, as shown in table 5.
We used the "thin" Ruby web server as it provides quite good performance. We first display an unlabelled static page to measure the influence of tracking without flow enforcement. RubyTrack and FlowR add an overhead of 7% and 12% respectively compared to native Ruby. The performance penalties for retrieving a medical record from our database are of the same order (10% and 15% respectively).
We add the IFC advice at initialization; the web server executes the initialization script only once. This removes the very significant overhead generated when creating the advices. Furthermore, as discussed previously, our tracking algorithm is slightly more complicated than RubyTrack and flows are controlled for every protected object (including basic variables), while RubyTrack only enforces flow at strategic points. This explains our performance decrease compared to RubyTrack.
Obtaining more precise results on exactly where compute-time was being spent in our library proved to be impractical, or at least to require too much engineering in the time available. As discussed above in section 6.1, switching on and off advices takes time, i.e. activating IFC slows down the library usually used to trace Ruby application performance. 
Related Work

Aspect Oriented Programming
Critics of aspect oriented programming [45] argue that AOP reduces the understandability of a program. In our case we are quite confident that expressing constraints in a well-defined and compact fashion in a single file is a better approach than merging them with functional code. Indeed, in standard IFC library, one would need to explore the code in order to understand where IFC constraints are applied.
Others argue [14, 21, 48] that AOP leads to software that is harder than usual to evolve. In our opinion and from experience, the solution we propose is easier to maintain. Indeed, changes to an underlying library implementation do not affect the policy rules defined. The only changes that the security expert needs to keep track of are changes of interface in the case of constraints expressed on methods.
Ramachandran et al. [37] proposed to implement access control using AspectJ [23] around object method calls. In their work each thread is associated with a certain level of clearance, and each object as well. If the current thread level of clearance matches the object on which the program is trying to perform a method call, then the program executes, otherwise it fails. Although our algorithms bear some similarity, [37] does not address information flow control. AspectJ has also been used to implement some of the IFC features of DEFCon [31] .
Masuhara et al. [30] discuss the difficulty of implementing crosscutting security features through AOP based on data origin. They propose a new point-cut that they named dflow. This point cut allows some procedures to execute on data which flow from object a to b. Although we considered implementing the execution of some programmer-determined procedure on some data with a specific label when it reached a certain object b (effectively providing the same end result), we decided that it was going beyond IFC and therefore beyond the scope of our library.
AOP has been used to implement security features: access control [37, 47] , error detection and handling [28] , automatic login [51] , hardening the security of existing libraries [32] or preventing buffer overflow [43] are some examples where AOP has been used successfully. AOP proves itself a useful and powerful tool as it allows the expression of security concerns that should apply to the whole application while completely decoupling their specification from the application functionality.
Information Flow Control
Dynamic Library IFC generally presents poor support for implicit flow, as discussed in section 2.3. There are obvious exceptions such as implementation for a purely functional language [39] . In other types of language, solutions include going through static techniques [33] or code rewriting to transform implicit flows into explicit ones [49] . However, AOP techniques present potential alternatives to address implicit flow. Indeed the new "join-point on loop" proposed by Harbulot et al. [16] or "join-point on region" by Akai et al. [1] may be interesting directions to investigate for dynamic implicit flow tracking. We have not yet addressed implicit flow in our work.
Information Flow Control was first enforced statically [9] , then Myers introduced some dynamic elements [33] to provide more flexibility at runtime and a decentralised model. More recent work such as SafeWeb [17] or GIFT [25] provides dynamic taint tracking.
We have investigated the provision of IFC at the language level, with its associated tradeoffs. IFC can be provided at other system levels, with different tradeoffs. For example Suh et al. [46] propose a specific hardware architecture to support information flow. Asbestos [13] is an operating system design to provide IFC mechanisms. Finally, there are solutions running on top of a Linux OS [24] or providing a platform for distributed systems [7, 59] . These different levels of implementation, which we discuss in detail in [3] , do not necessarily address the same issues. Indeed, while OS level implementation of IFC allows better and easier protection of I/O than the language level, it would require more engineering to create isolation within the application. IFC concerns could have an influence on the application architecture that might be considered too strong.
Conclusions and future work
Regardless of the precise implementation properties, we believe that the primitives we propose here are a natural way to express flow constraints within an application in an OO Language. We also believe that the AOP approach discussed in this paper is a good solution to providing IFC when control over the system running an application is not available. That is, our IFC runs above unmodified platforms as well as potentially extending unmodified applications.
We assume a benevolent developer, which is standard for all library-level IFC implementations; and we do not support implicit flow tracking, again, the case for most library-level IFC. We will continue to evaluate the tradeoffs involved in taking the AOP approach compared with using more disruptive and less maintainable mechanisms that might provide higher security and performance. The Brain-Portal implementations using RubyTrack and FlowR have provided a first case study.
Our current implementation does not support multi-threading but this is not inherent to our proposed model. Rather, it is constrained by the AOP library implementation we used and the general poor support of real multithreading in the standard Ruby implementation.
Another issue that may arise when using AOP to enforce IFC is when several AOP advice are implemented over the same object; for example enforcing IFC, logging and authentication. In such a scenario it may be necessary to determine whether composition issues arise, as discussed in [12, 36] .
It is important to note that our library does not require the rewriting of any code and therefore does not modify program behaviour, except when IFC constraint violation forces the process to abort. So when performance is a critical issue, the library can be used during development, to track unexpected data flows, and ignored in deployment. Again, a tradeoff is involved between performance and security.
In this paper we presented an IFC library implementation using AOP, with primitives to provide IFC concepts, and mechanisms to enforce IFC. We separated application functionality from security concerns. Programmers need not be aware of IFC during application development, and a security specialist can add IFC as a separate phase. This is good engineering practice and achieves better maintainability. However, we described our model informally and a more formal model would be required before substantial future work was carried out.
We believe that using AOP to provide IFC has many advantages which we intend to evaluate further in future work, especially in the context of cloud deployment.
